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INTRODUCTION 
The US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have brought more Foreign 
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Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) cases in recent years than 
during any period since the passage of the statute in 1977. 
Significant sums have been paid by business organizations to 
resolve those actions. Corporate boards have been faced with 
seemingly impossible choices regarding potential liability, self-
reporting, cooperation, expansive and costly investigations, and 
extensive remediation. 
Recently the number of actions initiated has declined. 
Nevertheless, any organization conducting business overseas is 
immediately confronted with issues regarding FCPA compliance. 
This is particularly true if business is being conducted in high 
risk areas of the world such as China (“PRC”). There, local laws, 
years old customs, and demands to partner with, or work 
through, local organizations can make conducting business a 
daunting process. Indeed, the company can quickly find itself in 
the middle of a DOJ or SEC FCPA investigation tied to the 
actions of local agents and affiliates. 
Three key issues for business organizations with operations 
in the PRC emerge in this context: 1) Is FCPA enforcement still 
a priority; 2) What are critical current issues; and 3) What are 
the key trends for the future? Each of these points will be 
analyzed below. 
I. IS FCPA ENFORCEMENT A CURRENT PRIORITY? 
While FCPA enforcement has been an enforcement 
priority, the number of actions brought has declined recently. 
For example, the SEC reports that in 2013 it brought eight 
FCPA actions. The prior year the agency brought ten actions, 
while in 2011 and 2010 it brought fifteen in each year. 1 Trends 
in criminal actions brought by the DOJ are similar. 2 Overall it is 
clear that the number of cases being brought in recent years has 
declined. 
                                                                                                             
1. Spotlight on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://
www.sec.gov/spotlingt/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited May 12, 2014). 
2. See, e.g., Mark Jenkins et al., FCPA Compliance in China, FIDELITY FORENSICS 
GROUP 3, http://www.fidelityforensics.com/wordpress/2013/10/18/fcpa-compliance-
china (last visited May 12, 2014); Corporate FCPA Enforcement Was Down in 2013, Or Was 
It Up, Or Was It Down?, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Jan. 9, 2014), http://
www.fcpaprofessor.com/ corporate-fcpa-enforcement-was-down-in-2013-or-was-it-up-or-
was-it-down. 
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In view of these statistics some may be lead to believe that 
enforcement efforts have waned. Before reaching this 
conclusion, however, two critical points should be considered: 
1) The recent remarks of enforcement officials; and 2) 
Significant recent cases. Together, these points suggest that 
FCPA enforcement continues to be a key focus of enforcement 
officials. 
A. Remarks of Enforcement Officials 
In recent remarks enforcement officials have stressed the 
importance of FCPA enforcement, suggesting that efforts be 
increased. For example, Acting DOJ Deputy AG Mythili Raman, 
Chief, DOJ Criminal Division, recently called FCPA and anti-
corruption enforcement a “core priority of the Department of 
Justice.” 3 
To illustrate her point, Ms. Raman noted that since 2009 
the DOJ has resolved over forty corporate corruption cases. 
Those include nine of the top ten largest settlements in terms of 
penalties in the history of the Act, resulting in about US$2.5 
billion being paid in monetary fines. The DOJ is also 
coordinating with officials from other countries. 
Ms. Raman went on to note that last February the DOJ, 
SEC, and FBI hosted what she called an “unprecedented” 
meeting of “130 judges, prosecutors, investigators, and 
regulators from more than thirty countries, multi-development 
banks, and international organizations around the world.” The 
purpose was for training and to exchange ideas for combating 
foreign corruption. The conference also furthered specific 
prosecutions. 
Collectively these points illustrate the priority being given 
to FCPA enforcement. Ms. Raman thus concluded her remarks 
by calling for increased, not decreased, enforcement efforts, 
stating that “I am certain that now is the time to enhance, not 
                                                                                                             
3. Mythili Raman, Acting DOJ Deputy Att’y Gen., Chief, DOJ Criminal Division, 
Keynote Address at the Global Anti-Corruption Congress, Washington, D.C. (June 17, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2013/crm-speech-
130617.html. 
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diminish, our anti-corruption efforts. The fight against global 
corruption is a critical mission . . . .”4 
B. Significant Recent Cases 
Examination of the FCPA actions brought in the last twelve 
months confirms Ms. Raman’s comments. In the last twelve 
months the DOJ and the SEC have teamed to bring three of the 
largest FCPA cases in the history of the Act when measured by 
the sums paid to resolve the actions.5 In May 2013 French oil 
and gas giant Total, S.A. paid US$398 million to the DOJ and 
the SEC to resolve FCPA charges and is now number four on the 
top ten list. In November 2013 Swiss based Weatherford 
International paid US$152 million to resolve FCPA charges and 
is now number ten on the list. And, in January 2014 Alcoa, Inc. 
paid US$384 million to settle DOJ and SEC FCPA charges, 
putting the firm at number five. In addition, the Department of 
Justice recently brought criminal FCPA charges against three 
individuals. Collectively these actions suggest that FCPA 
enforcement continues to be a priority. The cases are briefly 
summarized below. 
1. Total S.A.6 
The actions involving Total stem from the efforts of the 
company to re-enter the Iranian oil market. In 1995 Total 
negotiated a development contract with the National Iranian Oil 
Company (“NIOC”), a government instrumentality, for the 
development of the Sirri A and E oil and gas fields. Prior to 
executing the agreement, Total met with an Iranian Official who 
had the ability to influence the award of the contract. The firm 
and the official entered into a so-called consulting arrangement 
which was used as a conduit for US$16 million in corrupt 
payments over the next two and one half years. 
                                                                                                             
4. Id. (emphasis added). 
5. The Top Ten list is maintained by the FCPA blog and updated periodically. It is 
available at www.fcpablog.com. 
6. United States v. Total, S.A., Criminal No. 1:13 cr 239 (E.D. Va. Filed May 29, 
2013); In re Total, S.A., Adm. Proc. File No. 3-15338 (filed May 29, 2013). The 
discussion of the cases in the text is drawn from the court papers in these cases. 
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In 1997 the company entered into a second arrangement 
with NIOC. This agreement was to develop phases 2 and 3 of the 
South Pars gas field, a joint venture with a number of other 
multinational oil and gas companies. As with the initial project, 
Total entered into a consulting arrangement with the Iranian 
official. Over the next several years the company made a series 
of payments under this agreement which totaled about US$44 
million. None of the payments were properly recorded in the 
books and records of the company. 
Total resolved the criminal charges by entering into a 
deferred prosecution agreement under which it paid a criminal 
fine of US$245.2 million, retained a monitor for three years, 
enhanced its compliance systems, and continued to cooperate 
with enforcement officials. To resolve the SEC administrative 
proceeding the company consented to the entry of a cease and 
desist order based on Exchange Act sections 30A, 13(b)(2)(A), 
and 13(b)(2)(B), and agreed to pay disgorgement of US$153 
million and retain a consultant. 
2. Weatherford International, Inc.7 
Weatherford International Ltd. and its subsidiaries resolved 
FCPA charges with the DOJ and SEC and also settled export 
control charges, paying a total of US$252 million. The bribery 
charges are based on three schemes. The first involved a joint 
venture established by Weatherford subsidiary Weatherford 
Services in Angola with two local entities in 2005. The two local 
entities principals included foreign officials. The venture was 
used solely as a conduit for millions of US dollars of payments by 
the Weatherford subsidiary to the foreign officials controlling 
them, according to the court papers. In exchange for the 
payments, Weatherford Services obtained lucrative contracts and 
information about the pricing of competitors. 
The second scheme involved the bribery in Africa of a 
foreign official by employees of Weatherford Services. The 
                                                                                                             
7. United States v. Weatherford Services, Ltd., No. 13 CR 734 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 
26, 2013); United States v. Weatherford International Ltd., No. 13 CR 733 (S.D. Tex. 
filed Nov. 26, 2013); SEC v. Weatherford International, Ltd., Civil Action No. 4:13-CV-
03500 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 26, 2013). The discussion in the text is based on the court 
papers filed in these actions. See also SEC Lit. Rel. No. 22880 (Nov. 26, 2013). 
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purpose of the payments was to secure the renewal of an oil 
services contract. The payments were made through a freight 
forwarding agent. The payment made was concealed by the 
creation of sham purchase orders and similar records crafted by 
the forwarding agent. The contract was renewed in 2006. 
The third scheme involved payments in the Middle East 
from 2005 through 2011 by employees of Weatherford Oil Tools 
Middle East Limited (“WOTME”). In this scheme what were 
claimed to be volume discounts to a distributor who supplied 
company products to a government owned national oil company 
were actually used to create a slush fund. That fund was used to 
make payments to the national oil company. During the period 
WOTME paid about US$15 million to the distributor. 
To resolve the FCPA charges with the DOJ, the company 
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement. It required the 
payment of an US$87.2 million criminal penalty and the 
retention of a monitor for eighteen months. The underlying 
criminal information contains one count of violating the 
internal controls provisions of the FCPA. In addition, 
Weatherford Services agreed to plead guilty to violating the anti-
bribery provisions. 
The SEC’s complaint alleged violations of Exchange Act 
sections 30A, 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B). To resolve the 
charges the company agreed to pay US$90,984,844 in 
disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and a US$1.875 million 
civil penalty assessed in part for a lack of cooperation during the 
investigation. US$31,646,907 of the payment will be satisfied by 
the agreement of the company to pay an equal amount to the 
USAO. 8 
3. Alcoa, Inc.9 
The DOJ and SEC FCPA actions involving the company 
were against its majority-owned and controlled global alumina 
                                                                                                             
8. In a separate matter, from 1998 through 2007, the company and certain 
subsidiaries violated various US export control and sanctions laws. During the period 
they exported or re-exported oil and gas drilling equipment to sanctioned countries 
Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria. These charges were resolved with the payment of US$100 
million, a deferred prosecution agreement and two guilty pleas. 
9. United States v. Alcoa World Alumina LLC, No. 14-CR-00007-DWA (W.D. Pa. 
January 9, 2014); In re Alcoa Inc., Adm. Proc. File No. 3-15673 (January 9, 2014) 
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sales company and the parent, which is a public company based 
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Alcoa of Australia, a subsidiary of 
Alcoa, secured a long term alumina supply agreement with 
Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. (“Alba”), an aluminum smelter 
controlled by the government of Bahrain. Subsequently, 
members of the Royal Family that controlled the tender process 
had Alcoa of Australia insert a London based middleman into 
the arrangement. As the relationship between Alcoa of Australia 
expanded with the middleman, invoices with increasingly large 
volumes of alumina were submitted through shell companies. 
This permitted the consultant to pay bribes to certain 
government officials. 
In 2004 Alcoa World Alumina secured a long term alumina 
supply agreement with Alba. It called for the sale of over 1.5 
million metric tons of alumina to Alba through offshore shell 
companies owned by the consultant. The consultant added 
mark-ups to the price of the alumina totaling about US$188 
million over a four year period beginning in 2005. Those mark-
ups were used to pay bribes. The payments were concealed 
through false invoices. While officials at Alcoa reviewed certain 
matters involved in these transactions, the SEC’s Order states 
that there is “no findings that an officer, director or employee of 
Alcoa knowingly engaged in the bribe scheme.” 
To resolve the criminal case Alcoa World Alumina agreed 
to plead guilty to one count of violating the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA. The firm also agreed to pay a US$209 
million criminal fine and administratively forfeit US$14 million. 
Alcoa, as part of the resolution, agreed to maintain and 
implement an enhanced global anti-corruption compliance 
program. 
The SEC’s Order alleges violations of Exchange Act Section 
30A(a), 30A(g), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B). To resolve the 
proceeding the firm consented to the entry of a cease and desist 
order based on Section 30A as well as the books and records and 
internal controls sections. It also agreed to pay disgorgement of 
US$175 million, a portion of which is deemed satisfied by the 
payment of the forfeiture order in the criminal case to the 
extent that obligation is paid. The total amount paid to resolve 
the criminal and civil charges places Alcoa at number five on the 
list of top ten FCPA cases by the amount paid. 
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4. Individuals10 
In November 2013 criminal FCPA charges against three 
foreign nationals were announced by the Department of Justice. 
At that time criminal complaints were filed against Knut 
Hammarskjold and Joseph Sigelman, former co-CEOs of 
PetroTiger. Each complaint contains one count of conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA, 
three counts of FCPA violations and one count of money 
laundering. The charges are based on a scheme executed by the 
two men, along with the former general counsel of the 
company, Gregory Weisman. 
As part of the scheme three payments were made on behalf 
of the company to an official at Columbia’s state-owned and 
controlled oil company to secure a lucrative oil services contract. 
Initially, the defendants tried to conceal the payments by 
depositing them into the account of the official’s wife. When 
that proved unsuccessful the payments were deposited into the 
account of the official. The defendants are also alleged to have 
attempted to secure kickback payments at the expense of 
PetroTiger’s board members in connection with the negotiation 
of an acquisition. Mr. Weisman pleaded guilty on November 8, 
2013, to a criminal information charge of one count of 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and to commit fire fraud.11 The 
actions were unsealed on January 6, 2014. 
II. CRITICAL CURRENT ISSUES 
Three critical, current issues for business organizations 
center on self-reporting and cooperation, compliance, and 
doing business in high risk environments such as the PRC. 
A. Self-reporting and Cooperation 
One of the most difficult issues business organizations face 
is self-reporting and cooperation. It is a complex and difficult 
decision which must be considered in the context of the fact 
and circumstances of each situation, carefully assessing the 
                                                                                                             
10. United States v. Hammarskjold, No. 13-2086 (D. N.J. filed Nov. 8, 2013); 
United States v. Sigelman, No. 13-2087 (D.N.Y. filed Nov. 8, 2013) 
11. United States v. Weisman, No. 1:13-CR-00730 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 8, 2013). 
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pertinent facts, the legal obligations of the company, and the 
impact of self-reporting and cooperation. 
Enforcement officials are increasing the pressure on 
companies to self-report and cooperate. This is illustrated by the 
recent remarks of Deputy Attorney General James Cole and two 
recent settlements. In his remarks Deputy AG Cole stressed the 
importance of cooperation late last fall noting: 
Because your role in the enforcement of the FCPA is vital to 
its success, I want to assure you that we are committed to 
demonstrating the benefits of your working cooperatively 
with us. But, this does not mean that we will blindly accept 
the conclusions of internal investigations. To the contrary, 
we will continue to actively pursue our own investigations in 
order to pressure test the results of your internal 
investigations and be able to identify those companies that 
are truly cooperating.12 
Mr. Cole stressed that the cooperation must be genuine 
and cautioned against what he called “gamesmanship,” that is, 
creating the appearance of cooperation without actually 
furnishing it. Self-reporting and cooperation might thus be 
viewed as a balance where on the one side enforcement officials 
are determined to hold those who violate the law accountable, 
but on the other intend to reward self-reporting and 
cooperation. Mr. Cole stressed that the choice belongs to each 
individual firm.13 
The actions involving Weatherford, previously discussed, 
and Diebold, Inc. fortify these points. In Weatherford the 
company was sanctioned for failing to cooperate with the 
enforcement inquiries. In Diebold, the firm did in fact self-report 
and cooperated but was criticized by enforcement officials for 
what they claimed was inadequate remediation.14 These cases, 
                                                                                                             
12. James Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., Address at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Conference, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-131119.html. 
13. Id. 
14. Diebold, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-01609 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 22, 2013). The 
actions centered on payments made through the subsidiaries of the company in China, 
Indonesia and Russia from 2005 through 2010. In China, for example, there were 
payments for travel, entertainment, and gifts to foreign officials through its subsidiary, 
Diebold China. In addition, the subsidiary provided bank officials with cash gifts 
ranging from less than US$100 to over US$600. Similar travel and entertainment 
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along with Mr. Cole’s remarks, serve to highlight some of the 
key questions surrounding the issue of self-reporting and 
cooperation. 
B. Compliance and Its Impact 
Compliance is not a defense but it may be sufficient to earn 
the firm a declination or at least a reduced penalty. Accordingly, 
implementing appropriate compliance procedures may be 
critical not just to avoid liability but, if necessary, mitigating it. 
This is illustrated by the recent actions involving Morgan Stanley 
employee Garth Peterson. There the firm received a declination 
based on its compliance procedures. Mr. Peterson pleaded 
guilty to a criminal charge.15 
Garth Peterson was the head of Morgan Stanley’s Shanghai 
office. The FCPA charges stem from his dealings with the former 
Chairman of Yongye Enterprise (Group) Co., a Chinese state 
owned entity involved in real estate. From 2004 through 2008 
Morgan Stanley partnered with Yongye on a number of 
significant Chinese real estate investments. At the same time Mr. 
Peterson and the Chairman expanded their dealings in real 
estate, secretly acquiring real estate from Morgan Stanley and 
investing in other endeavors. Mr. Peterson did not disclose these 
dealings to his firm as required. 
In one transaction Mr. Peterson encouraged his firm to sell 
an interest in Shanghai real estate to Yongye. Mr. Peterson 
falsely represented that the purchaser was owned by the Chinese 
company. In fact it was owned by Mr. Peterson, the Chairman, 
                                                                                                             
expenses were paid for state officials by the other two subsidiaries. While there is no 
claim that the parent company knew about the payments in Indonesia, in China a local 
regulatory proceeding brought the matter to the attention of the parent as did the 
discovery of payments by distributors in Russia. Nevertheless, the practices continued. 
Diebold resolved the FCPA charges with the DOJ, agreeing to pay a US$25.2 million 
penalty and entered into a three year deferred prosecution agreement to resolve 
possible criminal charges. With the SEC, Diebold consented to the entry of a 
permanent injunction prohibiting future violations of Exchange Act sections 30A, 
13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) and agreed to pay disgorgement and prejudgment 
interest totaling US$22,972,942. Although the company self-reported and cooperated, 
a monitor was installed under the deferred prosecution agreement and SEC settlement 
for at least eighteen months. 
15. United States v. Peterson, CR 12-224 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 25, 2012); SEC v. 
Peterson, Civil Action No. CV 12-2033 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 25, 2012). The facts in the 
text are drawn from the court papers in the proceedings. 
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and a Canadian lawyer. Mr. Peterson thus negotiated for both 
sides. He secured Morgan Stanley’s approval for the sale at a 
discounted price. As a result of the deal the shell company had 
an immediate profit of about US$2.5 million. 
In 2006 Morgan Stanley negotiated at least five separate 
Chinese real estate investments involving Yongye. Mr. Peterson 
invited the Chinese official to invest along with Morgan Stanley 
and its funds to reward him for what he had done for the firm 
and further incentivize him. He set up an arrangement for 
Morgan Stanley to sell the Chinese official a 3% interest in each 
deal he brought to the firm for the cost of 2%. This gave the 
official a discount of 1% which Mr. Peterson called a finder’s 
fee. Mr. Peterson also promised the official an added return. 
When Mr. Peterson disclosed this arrangement to his supervisors 
he was warned of the FCPA bribery implications and told to 
drop the arrangement. Nevertheless, Mr. Peterson paid the 
official. 
Mr. Peterson settled FCPA charges with the DOJ and the 
SEC. In the criminal case he pleaded guilty to one count of 
conspiracy to evade the company’s internal accounting controls 
and was sentenced to serve nine months in prison followed by 
three years of supervised release. Mr. Peterson also settled with 
the SEC, whose complaint alleged violations of the bribery and 
books and records and internal control provisions. He agreed to 
the entry of an injunction and to pay disgorgement of 
US$250,000. In addition, Mr. Peterson will relinquish his 
interest in Shanghai real estate valued at about US$3.4 million 
and he consented to be permanently barred from the securities 
industry. 
The company, in contrast, was not prosecuted in view of its 
compliance procedures and cooperation. Both the DOJ and the 
SEC acknowledged Morgan Stanley’s internal controls and 
compliance procedures.16 According to enforcement officials, 
                                                                                                             
16. The press release issued by the DOJ highlighted Morgan Stanley’s internal 
compliance procedures:  
Morgan Stanley maintained a system of internal controls meant to ensure 
accountability for its assets and to prevent employees from offering, 
promising or paying anything of value to foreign government officials. 
Morgan Stanley’s internal policies which were updated regularly to reflect 
regulatory developments and specific risks, prohibited bribery and addressed 
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those policies were regularly updated to reflect regulatory 
developments and specific risks and prohibited bribery. They 
also addressed the corruption risks associated with giving gifts, 
business entertainment, travel, lodging, meals, charitable 
contributions, and employment. In addition, the procedures 
provided for periodic training. The firm regularly monitored 
transactions and required employees to disclose outside business 
interests. 
Mr. Peterson received FCPA training seven times and was 
reminded to comply with the Act on thirty-five occasions. In one 
instance the firm specifically told him that employees of Yongye 
were government officials for FCPA purposes. He was also 
furnished with written materials which he maintained in his 
office. Periodically Morgan Stanley required Mr. Peterson to 
certify compliance with the Act. Those certifications were 
maintained as a part of his permanent record. 
The DOJ concluded that Morgan Stanley’s internal policies 
and procedures provided reasonable assurances that its 
employees were not bribing government officials.  In view of 
those procedures, as well as the fact that the firm voluntarily 
reported the matter and cooperated, the DOJ declined to 
prosecute the firm. The SEC also acknowledged the cooperation 
of Morgan Stanley.17 
                                                                                                             
corruption risks associated with the giving of gifts, business entertainment, 
travel, lodging, meals, charitable contributions and employment. Morgan 
Stanley frequently trained its employees on its internal policies, the FCPA and 
other anti-corruption laws. Between 2002 and 2008 Morgan Stanley trained 
various groups of Asia-based personnel on the FCPA 54 times. During the 
same period, Morgan Stanley trained Peterson on the FCPA seven times and 
reminded him to comply with the FCPA at least 35 times. Morgan Stanley’s 
compliance personnel regularly monitored transactions, randomly audited 
particular employees, transactions and business units, and tested to identify 
illicit payments. Moreover, Morgan Stanley conducted extensive due 
diligence on all new business partners and imposed stringent controls on 
payments to business partners. 
US DOJ Press Release, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for 
Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (April 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html. 
17. The FCPA cases involving Biomet Inc. are another example of potential 
liability from alleged violations in the PRC and other countries being mitigated 
through cooperation. Biomet Inc. is a global medical device company headquartered 
in Warsaw, Indiana whose shares are listed on NASDAQ. The company, along with its 
subsidiaries, made more than US$1.5 million in payments in violation of the FCPA 
from 2000 to 2008 to publicly-employed health care providers in Argentina, Brazil, and 
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C. Compliance—Basic Principles 
Implementing a sound compliance system does not 
necessarily require that the firm expend huge sums or purchase 
every new product in the FCPA market place. What it does 
require is that firms carefully and thoughtfully construct a 
system based on key principles. Those principles were explicated 
in the recently published DOJ/SEC Guide regarding the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.18 They require: 
y Tone at the top: “[C]ompliance begins with the board of 
directors and senior executives setting the proper tone for 
the rest of the company.”19 This requires more than a 
good, well written program. Rather, it requires the 
creation of a dynamic, strong culture which demands fair 
play. 
y Code of conduct: The foundation of any set of procedures is 
often the code of conduct. As the Guide states: The 
policies and procedures of the organization should 
“outline responsibilities for compliance within the 
company, detail proper internal controls, auditing 
practices, and documentation policies, and set forth 
disciplinary procedures.”20 These can take a wide variety of 
                                                                                                             
China. Biomet China made illegal payments through a distributor in China who 
provided publicly-employed doctors with money and travel in exchange for purchases 
with the knowledge of Biomet employees. The payments were falsely recorded in the 
books and records of the company. The company resolved charges with the DOJ by 
entering into a deferred prosecution agreement. Under the agreement the company 
paid a criminal fine of US$17.28 million, implemented rigorous internal controls, 
cooperated with the DOJ and retained a compliance monitor for eighteen months. The 
DOJ acknowledged the extensive cooperation of the company which consisted of 
“wide-reaching self-investigation . . . remedial efforts and compliance improvements.” 
As a result the company received a reduced penalty. United States v. Biomet, Inc., Case 
No. 1:12-cr-00080 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 26, 2012). Biomet also settled with the SEC, 
consenting to the entry of a permanent injunction without admitting or denying the 
allegations in the complaint, which prohibits future violations of Exchange Act sections 
30A, 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B). The company also agreed to pay disgorgement of 
US$4,432,998 along with prejudgment interest and retain an independent compliance 
consultant for eighteen months to review its FCPA compliance program. SEC v. 
Biomet, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-00454 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 26, 2012). 
18. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter FCPA Resource Guide], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
19. Id. at 57. 
20. Id. at 58. 
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forms such as a web-based compliance program for the 
approval of routine gifts, travel and entertainment. 
y Responsibility: Critical to any program is assigning 
responsibility “for oversight and implementation of a 
company’s compliance program to one or more specific 
senior executives within the organization. Those 
individuals must have appropriate authority within the 
organization, adequate autonomy from management, and 
sufficient resources . . .”21 
y Risk assessment: Fundamental to an effective compliance 
program is risk assessment. One size does not fit all or even 
every part of the organization. The approach and 
procedures may differ across the organization depending 
on the risk. As the Guide states: “Factors to consider, for 
instance, include risks presented by: the country and 
industry sector, the business opportunity, potential 
business partners, level of involvement with governments, 
amount of government regulation and oversight, and 
exposure to customs and immigration in conducting 
business affairs.”22 
y Training and updating: Compliance procedures must, to be 
effective, be communicated throughout the organization 
and periodically updated in view of experience. This can 
be done in a variety of ways such as through web-based and 
in-person training sessions. There should also be periodic 
reviews and updates of the system based on the experience 
of the organization and the dictates of the market place. 
y Incentives and disciplinary measures: The procedures must 
apply to every person in the organization. Critical to this is 
making integrity and ethics a part of the overall 
promotion, compensation and evaluation process which 
provides positive incentives for compliance. At the same 
time, there must be an appropriate disciplinary scheme for 
those who do not comply with the system. 
                                                                                                             
21. Id. at 58. 
22. Id. at 59. 
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y Third party due diligence: Agents, consultants, distributors 
and other third parties have frequently been at the center 
of FCPA actions. An effective set of procedures keyed to 
risk based principles, an understanding of the business 
rationale for using the third party and any payments and 
on-going monitoring is key. Again, this is not a one-size fits 
all approach but rather a program crafted to the dictates of 
the market place and situation. 
y Confidential reporting: Finally, any program should have a 
mechanism for confidential reporting. This can be used to 
encourage employees to report questions to the 
organization which should have a mechanism in place to 
conduct the appropriate internal investigation and take 
the proper steps. 
D. Doing Business in the PRC 
It is axiomatic that doing business in a high risk 
environment such as the PRC presents certain challenges. The 
reports regarding the current FCPA investigations into 
JPMorgan regarding its so-called “sons and daughters” program 
in which the children of prominent officials were retained is one 
example.23 Another is the inquiry into the drug promotion 
practices of Glaxo Smith Kline.24 
A recent report by the US China Business Council, titled 
Best Practices for Managing Compliance in China,25 based on a 
survey of enterprises currently conducting business in China, 
provides useful insight into current practices. It begins by 
                                                                                                             
23. See, e.g., Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, On Defensive, JPMorgan Hired 
China’s Elite, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2013, 9:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
12/29/on-defensive-jpmorgan-hired-chinas-elite/; Protecting JPMorgan from China’s 
Corruption, CNBC.COM (Dec. 21, 2013, 7:00 AM), www.cnbc.com/id/101302196/print; 
Aruna Viswanatha & Emily Flitter, Exclusive: U.S. Expands China Hiring Probe to Morgan 
Stanley, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2013. 4:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/
26/us-china-jpmorgan-morganstanley-idUSBRE9AP19T20131126 
24. See, e.g., Emily Flitter & Ben Hirschler, GlaxoSmithKline Under Investigation For 
Allegedly Bribing Doctors In China, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2013, 4:48 PM), available at http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/06/gsk-bribery_n_3882744.html. 
25. U.S. China Bus. Council, Best Practices for Managing Compliance in China 
(Oct. 2013), available at http://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/USCBC%
20Compliance%20Report%202013.pdf 
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recognizing the difficulty of conducting business in China while 
maintaining an effective compliance program: 
Foreign companies doing business in China encounter local 
perspectives and assumptions that make adherence to 
corporate compliance programs an ever evolving and 
challenging effort. Practices normally considered 
unacceptable in the U.S. may not only be allowed in China, 
but may even be strongly encouraged by local cultural 
conventions. Developing internal practices that take these 
norms into consideration—while protecting a company’s 
legal obligations and international reputation—is a difficult 
process that requires balancing strongly competing 
interests.26 
Companies doing business in China must manage not just 
FCPA compliance but also a variety of local laws while 
competing with enterprises that are not focused on anti-
corruption compliance. China does not have any overriding 
statute such as the FCPA, according to the Report. There are, 
however, local laws which companies must consider including: 
PRC criminal law; interpretations of select courts; anti-unfair 
competition law; and certain interim provisions on prohibition 
of commercial bribery activities. 
While contending with these laws, and maintaining FCPA 
compliance, business organizations must also compete with 
those who are not following the US statute. About 60% of 
companies reported in the survey that they are “more 
concerned with competition from firms not following FCPA 
strictures than with managing compliance program 
enforcement in China.” Thus 35% of the companies surveyed by 
the Business Council in a separate membership survey indicated 
a loss of business due to FCPA compliance. Nevertheless, none 
of the companies surveyed questioned the benefits of 
compliance included protection from possible violations, 
company branding in the market place, lower costs and a better 
ability to manage local government expectations. Indeed, one 
company reported an increase of 17% in profit margins after 
winnowing its distributor relationships after conducting rigorous 
FCPA due diligence.27 
                                                                                                             
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 6–7. 
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The Business Council survey also provides insight into 
compliance practices currently being utilized by companies 
doing business in China. These include: 
Structure: About 40% of the companies reported employing 
full time compliance officers at the local level either covering 
China or Asia-Pacific. A variety of reporting structures were used 
including: 1) direct report to Asia-Pacific leadership with a 
dotted line to China and US compliance heads; 2) Direct report 
to US compliance with a dotted line to China leadership; and 3) 
China compliance committee direct report to China leadership 
with a dotted line reporting to the US compliance head.28 
Local adoption: Over 90% of the companies surveyed 
reported that compliance policies are developed by their global 
teams and then implemented in specific regions. Nearly 60% 
have China-specific rules built on global compliance principles. 
Entertainment: One of the key risks faced by companies 
stems from commercial and government entertainment. Ninety-
four percent of the firms responding in the survey reported 
using mandatory monetary thresholds or limits on the amount 
that can be spent on entertainment and gift giving. Forty-four 
percent of those companies use global company wide limits in 
US dollars while 56% keep the thresholds in local currency. The 
average threshold for entertainment expenses in China is about 
US$72 per event. 
Gifts: Another key issue is gift giving, which is customary in 
China. Most companies reported that they discourage gifts. 
When they are unavoidable, typically firms favor giving gifts of 
minimal monetary value with corporate logos such as flash 
drives, calendars, notebooks, and small toys directly related to 
the business of the company. Most companies also maintain a 
threshold for gifts. The average amount for those in the survey 
was US$57.29 
Approval process: About 51% of those surveyed reported 
setting pre-approval expense thresholds that are tailored to 
various employee functions and levels. Only 16% of the 
                                                                                                             
28. Id. at 10. 
29. Id. at 13–15. 
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responding companies reported having no pre-approval 
process.30 
Social responsibility activities: Most companies reported that 
they do not participate in corporate social responsibility 
initiatives. Companies that do participate prefer to work with 
organizations that have an international track record or a global 
agreement with the company. 
Training: Those responding in the survey stressed frequent 
and continuous training. Some companies tie training to yearly 
reviews.31 
Auditing: The most common method for monitoring 
compliance is auditing. Approximately 44% of those responding 
reported utilizing an external firm while 36% use internal 
auditors and external firms.32 
Whistleblowers: Nearly all of the companies in the survey 
offer hotlines for staff to anonymously report compliance 
concerns. The most successful are those with multi-lingual 
support and local call-in numbers. 
Joint ventures: These present some of the most challenging 
issues, according to those who responded. Companies in the 
survey stated that the most effective approach comes from 
continual reinforcement over a long period. In view of the 
cultural nuances of conducting business in China those 
responding in the survey stated “it may be most effective to work 
behind the scenes with key company leaders to win their support 
for more stringent compliance observance.”33 
IV. TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE 
An analysis of current and past FCPA enforcement efforts 
suggests four key trends for the future: A renewed emphasis on 
individuals; an emphasis on cooperation and remedial efforts; 
an approach to the statutes which requires a broader 
understanding of regulatory trends; and whistleblowers. 
Individuals: While in the past there have been a number of 
actions brought against individuals, to a large extent the focus 
                                                                                                             
30. Id. at 16–17. 
31. Id. at 19. 
32. Id. at 21. 
33. Id. at 22–23. 
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has been on business organizations. Following the recent market 
crisis there has been an increased emphasis on individual 
accountability. 
In the FCPA area, individual accountability has always been 
difficult. Many of the cases involve either foreign corporations 
or the overseas subsidiaries of US enterprises. As such, 
frequently the individuals involved are not US citizens or 
residents. This can make holding individuals accountable in US 
courts difficult. The cases currently being litigated by the SEC 
are a good illustration where in one instance the court 
concluded that it had jurisdiction over an individual and in 
another a motion to dismiss was granted based on a lack of 
minimum contacts.34 At the same time the SEC is continuing 
with those actions. And, the Department of Justice recently 
announced criminal charges against three other individuals, 
discussed earlier. In the current regulatory environment this 
trend can be expected to continue. 
Cooperation and remedial efforts: The remarks of Deputy 
Attorney General Cole reiterated a long established policy of the 
Department of Justice and the SEC regarding self-reporting and 
cooperation. These have always been critical factors in FCPA 
investigations. 
The actions involving Weatherford and Diebold only serve 
to underscore the critical nature of these issues. Weatherford 
was fined for its lack of cooperation, not just denied cooperation 
credit. Likewise, Diebold was cited for its incomplete 
remediation despite having self-reported and cooperation. The 
critical point is that earning cooperation credit in the future is 
going to require real, substantial and perhaps extensive efforts. 
Trends: To understand recent trends in FCPA enforcement, 
it is critical to examine not just corruption actions but the 
broader regulatory environment in which the DOJ and the SEC 
make investigative and charging decisions. The SEC, for 
example, is often at the outer edge of enforcement, opening 
investigations on emerging issues. For example, when 
                                                                                                             
34. SEC v. Straub, No. 11 Civ. 9645 (S.D.N.Y. Opinion issued Feb. 8, 2013) 
(dismissing FCPA claims were individual did not have sufficient contacts with the 
United States); SEC v. Sharef, No. 11 Civ. 907 (S.D.N.Y. Opinion issued Feb. 19, 2013) 
(granting motion to dismiss where individual in FCPA case had sufficient contacts to to 
the United States). 
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Hollywood executives began making efforts to open the Chinese 
markets for their product, it was the SEC that initiated inquiries 
into those events.35 When firms had extensive dealings with 
sovereign wealth funds again it was the SEC opening the 
investigations.36 
Other trends also emerge from the broader regulatory 
environment. The sanctions imposed on Weatherford, for 
example, might be considered novel in the FCPA context, but in 
the past the SEC has imposed penalties on those who failed to 
cooperate during their investigations. Likewise, some may have 
considered the SEC’s action against Oracle Corporation37 for 
FCPA books and records violations based on what was 
characterized as a slush fund aggressive. Yet the Commission has 
                                                                                                             
35. See, e.g., Aruna Viswanatha, Exclusive: SEC Probes Movie Studios over Dealings in 
China, REUTERS (April 24, 2012, 6:14 PM) (“[The SEC] has sent letters of inquiry to at 
least five movie studios in the past two months . . . .”); see also Edward Wyatt et al., S.E.C. 
Asks if Hollywood Paid Bribes in China, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/business/global/sec-asks-if-hollywood-paid-bribes-in-
china.html; Michael White, Hollywood Moves on China No Matter What SEC Probe Finds, 
BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2012, 8:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-17/
hollywood-moves-on-china-no-matter-what-sec-probe-finds.html. 
36. See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Michael J. De La Merced, S.E.C. Looking Into Deals 
With Sovereign Funds, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://
www.famegame.com/news/articleInfo?q=2194268; Peter J. Henning, For Wall Street, 
Antibribery Inquiry Is Cause for Concern, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 18, 2011, 1:51 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/for-wall-street-antibribery-inquiry-is-cause-for-
concern/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Joshua Gallu, SEC Probes Financial Firms on 
Sovereign Funds Bribes, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2011, 6:59 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-14/sec-probes-financial-firms-on-possible-bribes-to-
sovereign-wealth-funds.html. 
37. SEC v. Oracle Corporation, CV 12 4310 (N.D. Ca. filed Aug. 16, 2012) is a 
settled FCPA action against the software company based on the actions of its subsidiary, 
Oracle India Private Limited. Specifically, the complaint states that over a two year 
period beginning in 2005, the subsidiary “parked” portions of the proceeds from 
certain sales to the Indian government and “put the money to unauthorized use, 
creating the potential for bribery or embezzlement.” Over a dozen transactions were 
structured so that US$2.2 million could be held by distributors off the books of the 
subsidiary. The money was then paid out to vendors, several of whom were mere store 
fronts. The complaint alleges violations of Exchange Act Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 
13(b)(2)(B). The company settled the action, consenting to the entry of a permanent 
injunction prohibiting future violations of the Sections cited in the complaint. It also 
agreed to pay a US$2 million civil penalty. The settlement takes into account the fact 
that Oracle voluntarily disclosed the matter, cooperated with the investigation, made 
significant enhancements to its FCPA program, and terminated the employees 
involved. See also Lit. Rel. No. 22450. 
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taken other similar actions in the securities area.38 Accordingly, 
in assessing regulatory trends it is critical to examine not just 
how enforcement officials are administering the FCPA but also 
the regulatory environment and the methods being utilized by 
those officials. 
Whistleblowers: Finally, while there has been much talk about 
the SEC’s Dodd-Frank whistleblower program, there is perhaps a 
more important trend in this area involving what might be 
called corporate whistleblowers. Companies such as Siemens, 
Johnson & Johnson, and others have expanded the notion of 
corporate cooperation to include corporate whistleblowing. 
Stated differently, to earn cooperation credit these firms and 
others are developing information not just about their own 
violations to furnish enforcement officials, but those of others. 
Given the insight of these firms into the business area and 
operations of their competitors, this type of information can be 
expected to be most effective.39 This trend has the potential to 
significantly impact FCPA enforcement as well as place 
increased pressure on the decision to self-report, cooperate, and 
conduct any necessary remediation. 
                                                                                                             
38. See, e.g., In re Goldman, Sachs & Co., Adm. Proc. File No. 3-14845 (Apr. 12, 
2012) (settled administrative proceeding which alleged the firm had inadequate 
procedures to protect material non-public information because there was a serious risk 
that type of information might be inappropriately shared by certain firm employees). 
39. Thomas O. Gorman & William P. McGrath, Jr., The New Era of FCPA 
Enforcement: Moving Toward a New Era of Compliance, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 341, 350 (2012) 
(discussing emerging trend of corporate whistleblowers seeking cooperation credit in 
FCPA investigations). 
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